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SEXUAL VIOLENCE: STANDING BY THE VICTIM
U.N. High Commissioner Navanethem Pillay*
This commentary was originally presented as the Frederick K. Cox Interna-
tional Law Center Lecture in Global Legal Reform on September 2, 2009 at
the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. U.N. High Commis-
sioner Navanethem Pillay was the recipient of the Cox Center's annual
Humanitarian Award for Advancing Global Justice, which was presented
after the lecture. The Inamori International Center for Ethics and Excel-
lence co-sponsored the event. A webcast of the lecture may be accessed at:
http://law.case. edu/centers/cox/webcast.asp?dt=-20090902&type=flv.
TRANSCRIPT:
I am deeply honored to receive the Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Humanitarian Award for
Advancing Global Justice. Today, I speak as the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, and also as a committed and long-time advocate for wom-
en's rights and gender equality, and as such someone who believes that to-
day's discussion is essential. Moreover, as a former president of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and a judge at the International Crimi-
nal Court, I can only warmly welcome your debate.
At the outset, let me say that I am heartened by the progress made
so far regarding the prosecution of sexual violence. The jurisprudence and
methodology developed by international justice mechanisms, as well as
national tribunals [and] regional courts, have made great strides. Yet we are
still wanting in our capacity to fully describe, understand, and address the
real experience of sexual violence from the victim's perspective.
Navanethem Pillay took office as U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on Sep-
tember 1, 2008. Ms. Pillay was the first woman to start a law practice in her home province
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[The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights]
(OHCHR) has closely studied whether the programs, policies, and the nor-
mative architecture which form the basis of the work of the international
community in a post-conflict setting provide adequate access to justice for
women seeking it. From this perspective, my Office, jointly with the non-
governmental organization Medica Mondiale, organized a conference en-
titled "Seeking Justice" last year. Our purpose was to gather a variety of
views and experiences on the topic of sexual violence and justice. This
event was attended by women from twenty-six countries, the majority of
which had recently been in conflict.
Many among the participants had themselves experienced such vi-
olence and had sought to end impunity through formal justice mechanisms.
Their purpose had been to ensure that sexual violence be prosecuted and
perpetrators held accountable. Three fundamental questions emerged from
that conference. They are:
* Whether the law has actually succeeded in describing women's
experience of violence;
0 Whether the ways in which sexual violence is investigated
assist in the understanding of that experience from a woman's perspective;
and
* Whether, in fact, our current practices actively discriminate in the
delivery of justice.
Against this background, I will outline for your consideration some
thoughts on the normative framework that anchors the prosecution of sexual
violence. I will then briefly examine how the legal architecture at our dis-
posal can contribute to more effective investigations. Finally, I will discuss
how we can draw from methodologies of other legal processes to bolster the
ability of international criminal justice mechanisms to prosecute sexual
violence.
Let me reiterate that from today's vantage point, considerable pro-
gress has been made from the time when violence and related offences
against women were merely seen as crimes of honour. Indeed, there has
been a quantum leap forward in the prosecution of sexual violence before
international tribunals. The jurisprudence of these courts represented a wa-
tershed for women whose war time suffering had long been considered as
an inevitable by-product of conflict, or as "collateral damage" that could be
more easily tolerated and, consequently, disregarded.
Through the work of international courts we have been able to es-
tablish once and for all that-where threshold criteria are met-rape during
international or internal armed conflict is a war crime, a crime against hu-
manity, and may constitute an element of genocide. It is a crime, often
planned and systematically perpetrated, that must be explicitly prosecuted
as such.
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I will leave to others to revisit the evolution of rape as a crime un-
der international law. It is, however, important to highlight here the inclu-
sion of an explicit reference to rape in the statutes of the ad hoc interna-
tional criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, the
post-conflict special courts, and the ICC. Subsequent judicial interpretations
of the ad hoc tribunals, as well as explanatory paragraphs from the ICC,
proscribe sexual violence.
The normative framework is, therefore, in place. However, if we
take even a cursory look at the extent of the prosecution of sexual violence
perpetrated during conflict, it is clear that we are only addressing the tip of
the iceberg in terms of cases examined, and merely scratching the surface in
terms of our understanding of how women experience violence.
I. THE ISSUE OF CONSENT AND THE TRAUMA OF DESCRIPTION
The experience of law that remains in the minds of women is how
they are treated in the courtroom, as it is there that justice is expected to be
delivered. Stemming from actual cases heard in court, some questions have
emerged consistently. These questions revolve around the dilemmas of
whether, in their interaction with formal justice mechanisms, women have
been encouraged to come forward and whether they felt that they have ob-
tained justice or, conversely, whether the process itself has re-traumatized
them and alienated potential witnesses. The core elements of this debate
concern the concept of "consent"--or lack thereof--on the part of the
women and the extent to which women are subjected to the most intrusive
questioning in order to establish the "nature" of the assault.
In the case of Akayesu, which I adjudicated in 1998, I defined rape
as a "physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed. . . [in] circumstances
which are coercive."' This was the first judgement on rape emanating from
the ad hoc tribunals. I framed my decision in this manner because it was
evident that, in the circumstances that were being described, there was no
place whatsoever for the consideration of consent. I hoped that this ruling
would remove the age-old practice of focusing on the conduct of the woman
victim in order to establish the guilt of the perpetrator. That decision was
not appealed. I was glad at the time [because] no one likes to be appealed! I
felt that this was indicative of a more enlightened understanding of rape. I
was wrong, since qualifications to the tribunal's initial decision were added.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) added the need for specific descriptions of the nature of the assault
[in Prosecutor v. Furundija].2 This could require the victim to re-construct
I See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 1 598, 37 I.L.M. 1399 (Sept. 2,
1998).
2 See Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998).
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and painfully re-live all phases of her rape as well as furnish graphic de-
scriptions of it.
Subsequent court definitions have allowed the possibility of raising
consent in particular situations. For example, the ICTY in the Kunerac case
established a double test to determine the presence of consent. 3 This [test]
involved looking both at the state of mind of the victim and that of the per-
petrator. The court established that the victim must give her consent volun-
tarily and as a result of her free will. For his part, the perpetrator must have
knowledge that penetration occurs without consent. This approach did not
overturn the concept of coercive circumstances, but it introduced trouble-
some qualifiers. In practice, the underlying focus was on the mens rea [and]
not on the actus reus of the crime, which means looking at the crime
through the gaze of the perpetrator not that of the victim, as well as describ-
ing it in his terms and from his perspective.
It may come as no surprise that the cross-examination of the young
woman witness in this case lead to her break down. I am told by those who
were on the OHCHR in Bosnia at the time that the willingness of women's
groups to continue to work with investigators was seriously affected by such
an outcome.
With its own description of the crime, the ICC has attempted to re-
build the fire-wall against admitting the element of consent. However, the
ICC's definition has yet to meet the test of practical application. In the
meantime, the cracks in the "brickwork" remain in evidence, as an expert
meeting organized by OHCHR determined.
My own views on the matter of consent in the context of rape in
warfare are grounded both in principle and in experience. I will never forget
the witnesses who came before the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) with harrowing accounts of atrocities. Despite the personal
pain that re-living unspeakable abuse caused them, these individuals refused
to remain silent or tacitly tolerant about violations of human rights. Their
testimony helped to dismantle barriers to dialogue and to mend and restore
the very foundations of peaceful coexistence, for it is the establishment of
truth that fosters reconciliation.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE AND THE DUTY
OF ENQUIRY
Allow me to briefly illustrate how key legal concepts applied by the
ad hoc international tribunals may have an impact on investigations. The
first of such concepts is known as joint criminal enterprise which has obvi-
ous application in cases of sexual violence.
3 See Prosecutor v. Kunerac, Kova6 & Vukovi6, IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001).
462 [Vol. 42:459
SEXUAL VIOLENCE
This concept refers to any individual who plans, instigates, com-
mits, orders, or abets the execution of crimes. It does not require the direct
hand or the physical participation of the accused in the perpetration of the
criminal act. Rather, it applies when this individual participates in criminal
conduct with a plurality of actors. By way of example, I cite here the case of
General Krsti6.4 In this instance, the ICTY considered that, as a member of
a joint criminal enterprise to execute massive transfers of people which en-
gendered a humanitarian crisis, Krsti6 was also responsible for the "inciden-
tal murders and rapes" that were deemed to be the "natural and foreseeable
consequences of the ethnic cleansing campaign." In short, the General
should have known that that these crimes were "inevitable," and he should
have taken measures to prevent them.
Further, with this case the court recognized that sexual violence
could be a natural and foreseeable consequence of other wartime violations,
rather than merely the outcome of the actions of errant soldiers whose
abuses are not directly the responsibility of their commanders. This thinking
was developed in the case of [Mom~ilo Krajignic], a political leader, by
including not only the crimes that were part of the original criminal enter-
prise, but also those, such as sexual violence, which the accused took no
action to prevent, despite his knowledge of the facts. 5
This brings us to the concept of the duty of enquiry which lies with
anyone in a superior position, military or civilian, who knew or had reason
to know that crimes were being perpetrated or about to be committed, and
failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent them and to
punish those responsible. The case of Colonel Blagki6 provides us with an
example of how this concept works in practice. 6 Colonel Blagki6 barracked
his troops in a school where civilian women were being detained. He was
found guilty of war crimes on the basis that the sexual violence which en-
sued was deemed "foreseeable" and that he "could not have been unaware
of the atmosphere of terror and the rapes which occurred at the school."7
Let me reiterate and summarize the key elements of the cases I have
just discussed. To begin with, international justice deemed rape as a natural
and foreseeable consequence of a lack of discipline in cases involving other
violations of international humanitarian law. Further, it established com-
mand responsibility and upheld the duty of inquiry to reflect the obligation
of persons in a position of responsibility and authority to prevent violations
from occurring, and to punish perpetrators when such crimes are committed.
4 See Prosecutor v. Krstid, IT-98-33, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2001).
5 See Prosecutor v. Krajignic, IT-00-39-T, Judgment (Sept. 27, 2006).
6 See Prosecutor v. BaUki6, IT-95-14-T, Judgment (Mar. 3, 2000).
7 Id. 732.
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In addition, it considered that culpability could involve all those engaged in
sexual violence crimes, directly or indirectly.
Now, I submit to you that the need to examine consent is at odds
with coercive situations, particularly in wartime. Imagine the events that led
to these and similarly-grounded judgments as they actually took place in
real life. Picture the school where women were held with unrestrained sol-
diers; the prison camp guarded by drunken, ill-disciplined troops; the com-
pound surrounded by Hutus, where terrified Tutsi women had sought refuge
and protection. Place these situations in their very real context of ethnic
cleansing and genocide and then ask yourselves if consent could have any-
thing to do, or have any meaning at all, in such circumstances.
III. ANALOGIES AND CONTIGUITY
With its landmark Resolution 1325 in 2000, 8 the U.N. Security
Council recognized that there is a fundamental difference in the way in
which men and women experience conflict. Further, it reminded the interna-
tional community of its obligations and responsibilities under international
human rights treaties and international humanitarian law, including the Ge-
neva Conventions. It instructed all U.N. Member States to uphold human
rights and non-discriminatory principles when these States are engaged in
conflict, peace-making, and peace-maintenance. Crucially, the Resolution
asserted the vital role that women play or must be called to play in putting
an end to conflict, including peace negotiations, as well as in post conflict
reconstruction.
Building on those premises and closing a gap in the Security Coun-
cil's action, Resolution 1820 of 2008 affirms that sexual violence against
women is a tactic of war and thus a security issue of literally vital concern. 9
As such, it demands commensurate responses. I am greatly encouraged by
this development, since I believe that both in situations of war and of peace
sexual violence must be examined and judged by fully taking into account
the victim's perspective and experience.
In order to do that better, we can draw from other legal regimes
which have established norms relevant to our discussion by way of contigu-
ity or analogy. From this perspective, I wish to posit that human rights law
and its cardinal principles of non-discrimination help to bolster the applica-
tion of criminal law and international humanitarian law in cases of sexual
violence, among others. Indeed, a comparative analysis of human rights
standards at the regional level is indicative of the trajectory of international
law concerning rape.
8 See S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
9 See S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).
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Of particular interest is, for example, the case of MC v. Bulgaria
heard by the European Court of Human Rights. ' 0 This judgement concerned
a case of rape perpetrated against a young girl. The court found that law
enforcers had failed to pursue investigations conscientiously because the
obvious signs of violence and resistance, required by Bulgarian law in cases
of rape, were not manifest in this particular instance. The court based its
judgment on the human rights obligation that binds all States to prevent and
protect against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and to ensure the
right to the enjoyment of a private and family life. The court thus found that
Bulgaria had failed to meet such obligations and in so doing was in viola-
tion of Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
In formulating their decision, the European judges also-and sig-
nificantly-took into account jurisprudence from the international ad hoc
tribunals in relation to coercive circumstances. While raising the issue of
consent, the court went on to state that law and practice must reflect the
changing social attitudes requiring respect for the individual's sexual auton-
omy and equality. It is hard to see how this interpretation could be faulty:
women are not walking around in a permanent state of sexual availability.
In Africa, eleven heads of State signed the 2006 Pact on Security,
Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region in which similar con-
clusions were reached." It was determined that the anti-rape legislation in
all these African countries had been drafted from the male perspective and
that such an approach could hardly account for women's experiences. To
correct this inequity, the 2006 agreement provided a new definition. It stated
that sexual violence occurs if a person: "with intent, knowledge, reckless-
ness, or negligence violates the sexual autonomy and bodily integrity of any
woman or child ....
In sum, the law at different latitudes and under different circum-
stances is moving forward to encompass the perspective and experience of
the victims of sexual violence. At times, this movement has produced an
10 See M.C. v. Bulg., App. No. 39272/98 (Dec. 4, 2003, final judgment Mar. 4, 2004),
available at http//www.coe.int/t/e/legal-affairs/legal co-operation/fightagainst-sexual_
exploitation of children/i _pc-es/CASE%200F%/o2OMC%20v.%20BULGARIA.pdf.
" International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Pact on Security, Stability and
Development in the Great Lakes Region art. 11, Dec. 14-15, 2006, available at httpi/
www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CFA06/(httpKeyDocumentsByCategory)/
EDBDB590CCI BF 1FEC1257248002EC747/$file/Great%20Lakes%20pact-en.pdf.
12 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Protocol on the Prevention and
Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children art. 4.1, Nov. 30, 2006, availa-
ble at httpJ/www.intemal-displacement.org/8025708FO04BE3B1/(httplnfoFiles)/
381B8D820A51C229C 12572FB002COC5B/$file/Final%20protocol.Sexual%20Violence%2
0-%20En.pdf.
2009]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
encouraging cross-fertilization of legal approaches which, hopefully, will
benefit victims everywhere.
Let me turn now to elements that are relevant to the context of in-
vestigations of sexual violence. In this regard, international agreements,
particularly the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized
Crime and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Per-
sons, Especially Women and Children,' are of particular interest.
The underlying rationale of the anti-trafficking protocol is that an
individual cannot freely consent to be trafficked. Indeed, when the elements
of the crime of trafficking have been established, the consent of the individ-
ual is irrelevant. Intelligence-based and solid police work can trace the traf-
ficking chain from the beginning to the end. Effective investigative method-
ology can probe the conditions of work and the level or absence of remu-
neration as indicators of labor exploitation. It follows that, technically, it is
entirely possible to investigate and prosecute trafficking without the need
for a victim to actually testify. Thus, a good prosecutor should be able to
argue a case without individual testimony by establishing the planning, the
modus, and the effects of the crime.
I submit to you that the application of this approach to investiga-
tions of rape in armed conflict could also yield optimal results.
Let me reiterate that sexual violence is almost invariably the fore-
seeable consequence in situations of conflict and in a climate that fosters
mass atrocities. In reconstructing the entire chain of responsibility and au-
thority, we must hold accountable all the perpetrators and their political and
military enablers.
In this perspective, we must do a better job of ensuring that victims
of sexual violence obtain full and real justice. To this end, we should never
lose sight of the fact that countries experiencing conflict or recovering from
war often have weak institutions. An originally patchy or damaged judicial
and police infrastructure often makes the system unable or unwilling to ad-
dress cases of sexual violence. As a result, impunity is the rule rather than
the exception. Impunity is also compounded by the fact that often victims of
sexual violence cannot find and identify perpetrators. Thus, they are left
with no judicial recourse. This can affect a large group. Indeed, the majority
of victims of sexual violence in armed conflict cannot either seek or obtain
justice.
Allow me to take this opportunity to draw your attention to an
OHCHR pilot project currently under development. This initiative involves
an assessment in the Democratic Republic of Congo of alternative ways in
which, beyond formal justice mechanisms, reparation and other remedies
13 United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, opened for signature Dec. 12, 2000, A/RES/55/25 (2000).
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could be made accessible to victims of sexual violence. The idea is to shift
the stigmatization of sexual violence from the victim to the perpetrator and
to provide or facilitate access to assistance. Moreover, we will explore how
to create a public and/or quasi-judicial forum for victims that will recognize
the harm that has been done to them with a view to ensure the effective im-
plementation of their right to remedy and reparation.
Ultimately, whether through formal justice systems or through al-
ternative means, we always need to pose the right questions to the right
people. We need to devise procedures that are truly protective and suppor-
tive of the victims. We need to frame sexual violence from their perspec-
tive. Above all, we must strive for an outcome that does not re-traumatize
the victims in their quest for justice.
Thank you.
